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ABSTRACT. Until recently, NASA did not consider allowing computers
total control of flight systems. Human operators, via hardware, have
constituted the ultimate safety control. In an attempt to reduce
costs, NASA has come to rely more and more heavily on computers and
software to control space missions. (For example, software is now
planned to control most of the operational functions of the
International Space Station.) Thus the need for systematic software
safety programs has become crucial for mission success.
Concurrent engineering principles dictate that safety should be
designed into software up front, not tested into the software after the
fact. 'Cost of Quality' studies have statistics and metrics to prove
the value of building quality and safety into the development cycle.
Unfortunately, most software engineers are not familiar with designing
for safety, and most safety engineers are not software experts.
Software written to specifications which have not been safety analyzed
is a major source of computer related accidents.
Safer software is achieved step by step throughout the system and
software lifecycle. It is a process that includes requirements
definition, hazard analyses, formal software inspections, safety
analyses, testing, and maintenance. The greatest emphasis is placed on
clearly and completely defining system and software requirements,
including safety and reliability requirements. Unfortunately,
development and review of requirements are the weakest link in the
process. While some of the more academic methods, e.g. mathematical
models, may help bring about safer software, this paper proposes the
use of currently approved software methodologies, and sound software
and assurance practices to show how, to a large degree, safety can be
designed into software from the start.
NASA's approach today is to first conduct a preliminary system hazard
analysis (PHA) during the concept and planning phase of a project.
This determines the overall hazard potential of the system to be built.
Shortly thereafter, as the system requirements are being defined, the
second iteration of hazard analyses takes place, the systems hazard
analysis (SHA). During the systems requirements phase, decisions are
made as to what functions of the system will be the responsibility of
software. This is the most critical time to affect the safety of the
software. From this point, software safety analyses as well as
software engineering practices are the main focus for assuring safe
software. While many of the steps proposed in this paper seem like
just sound engineering practices, they are the best technical and most
cost effective means to assure safe software within a safe system.
THE CURRENTNASA ENVIRONMENT
NASA, for the most part, is a research and development organization
where development of hardware - rockets, jet engines, turbo props,
satellites, etc. - has been, and still is, the primary focus.
Software, coming late into this hardware dominated environment, has
typically been viewed as; I) highly suspect, 2) a low cost catch-
all, and 3) necessary but not worth putting too much effort into.
In the cases where it is viewed as highly suspect, there have
always been hardware back-ups and crew operations to work around
the software. Ten to fifteen years ago, in the few situations
where software had to be used for some safety critical operation,
N-version programming with voting logic was used (e.g. shuttle
General Purpose Computers). However, that approach is too costly
for most programs today.
Hardware is more familiar. The ways to develop, test and operate
hardware have a long standing tradition and are trusted. Software,
on the other hand, is not generally well understood by managers,
the majority of which are hardware oriented. It makes sense and
can be considered sound engineering to rely on what is most
familiar, tried and true - the hardware and the ground and flight
crew which operate it. Thus, software was relegated to non-safety
related tasks with only a few exceptions.
Software's greatest asset is often, paradoxically, its greatest
liability. Software is flexible. It can perform a multitude of
tasks with little power or space. Software controlled hardware is
often lighter and more standardized. Its very versatility, its
ability to change without retooling or new weight calculations, its
ability to provide information quickly and in human readable
formats with less space and lower power consumption, are the very
reasons why we must exploit all the possibilities software presents
us. However, being considered "so easy to change" often leads to
many of the problems encountered with software. Software designs
are either left until last in a project or, if started early, keep
changing throughout the project because there is very little
understanding of the actual implications of how software is
properly designed and built. On one hand, software is not trusted,
on the other hand, the poor processes used in developing software
lead to justification of that mistrust.
NASA has, over the course of its many programs and projects, tended
to let each center, even each project within a center, choose it's
own software standards. Unlike our military, which is strict about
having one set of standards and enforcing contractor compliance to
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them, NASA (excluding hardware safety) has only 'guidelines' and
'suggested' standards. That is not to say that there are no
standards applied. It is merely up to each project manager to
choose the standards he/she thinks are best suited for their
project. There are no 'standard', or required, standards except
for hardware safety standards [I] and most of those are space
shuttle payload specific. This becomes a problem when large
dissimilar systems have to interface or interoperate. The largest
NASA systems, e.g. Space Shuttle and Kennedy Space Center launch
control systems, were developed in isolation without regard to
interoperability and with contractors using their own standards.
NASA is in the process of changing its approach to developing
projects that utilize software and, hopefully, this will lead to a
change in attitude about software's role as well. More and more
sophisticated controls and monitoring are needed as we do more and
more work in space and on the ground. Software is performing
safety critical tasks, despite claims to the contrary. So, like
hardware, software must also rely on a set of safety standards that
must be followed.
It is difficult for NASA, as a whole, to accept the need for
software standardization for a variety of reasons. To some degree,
a distaste for rules and regulations that is traditionally found in
many software engineers as well as a lack of understanding of
software in R&D oriented hardware managers, has lead to questioning
the need to place so much emphasis on a comprehensive software
process. Also, many managers and engineers are accustomed to
working on small projects. In this environment, different
management skills are stressed; the same five to ten people on a
project have usually conceived, designed, built, coded, and tested
all the hardware and software. Thus, due partly to the lack of
opportunity, there is a need to build the broader management skills
and appreciation for high level planning needed for today's more
complex systems. On larger systems, contractors handle the
majority of software management and choose the standards, usually
with limited guidance from NASA and a dictate that software "shall
not be used in critical applications". While there are many
successes, projects like Space Station have drawn attention to
NASA's difficulties. Both the Aeronautical Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP) and the National Research Council (NRC) [2] have pointed out
to NASA the need for software standardization, especially where
safety is concerned.
THE PATH TO CHANGE
This paper presents the emerging NASA approach to software safety.
First, NASA's goal must be to have effective software standards and
techniques that are adhered to by all developers of NASA software,
both in-house and by our contractors. Second, a comprehensive set
of software safety specific requirements and analyses must be
defined, understood, and used.
NASA is still working to achieve the first goal. As the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel annual report of March, 1994 shows:
"Findina #31: NASA's past approach to software
development has been to incorporate it within the
individual programs, allowing them to determine their own
requirements and development, verification and validation
procedures. In the future, as the complexity of NASA's
computer systems and the need for interoperability grow,
this mode of operation will be increasingly less
satisfactory. While NASA has some good software
practices, it does not have the overall management
policies, procedures, or organizational structure to deal
with these complex software issues."
"Recommendation _31: NASA should proceed to develop and
implement an agency wide policy and process for software
development, verification, and safety as quickly as
possible."
A few common techniques, procedures and practices are starting to
be applied within, if not across, the NASA centers. Some of these
practices are briefly discussed.
A Software Safety Standard (SSS) which addresses both the software
safety requirements and the safety analyses, is now in review
across NASA. It is due to be published by fall, 1994. Like its
hardware predecessor, it must be universally applied. The basic
approach to software safety as described in the standard, is
outlined below. A NASA Software Safety Guidebook will provide
more of the explanations of how, where, and where not, to apply the
software safety requirements and analyses put forth in the
Software Safety Standard. The guidebook will be completed about a
year after the standard is released.
THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE
NASA usually views the software lifecycle as a waterfall. While
proto-typing and spiral lifecycle methods are used, they are not
currently the typical approach. Thus most of our terminology is
based on the phases of the waterfall lifecycle model. While not
explicitly discussed in the Software Safety Standard, most of the
software safety process is applicable to all lifecycle models.
Figure 1 shows the typical software waterfall lifecycle, its
milestones, and the usual software tasks performed in each
progressive step (or phase). Figure 2 shows the software safety
lifecycle.
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Figure 1. The Software Waterfall Lifecycle
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Figure 2. System & Software Lifecycles and the Safety Tasks
JUST PLAIN GOOD DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES
The overall software development process is very important to
achieving complete, safe and reliable software. What good are
safety requirements and hazard report recommendations if the
software or the software development process is the major cause of
errors? Software development must have, as a minimum:
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software management plans that are followed;
configuration management of all documents, code and tests;
complete and unambiguous definition of all requirements early
in the lifecycle;
use of software language standards;
use of Yourdon, de Marco, etc. design techniques;
clear, well defined interfaces;
documented code that helps those that must maintain it;
comprehensive tests plans and procedures for unit through
acceptance testing;
problem tracking system that ties into the system problem
tracking during the software and hardware integration tests;
a software product assurance program that, as a minimum,
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assures the software completely meets, tests, and delivers all
requirements, the documentation is complete and up to date,
and established standards have been followed, or appropriately
waived;
pre-flight reviews that incorporate software status;
sign-off/acceptance procedures which include data acceptance
packages to insure what is shipped is what is meant to fly.
NASA has standards and/or guidelines which address all of the above
mentioned practices. However, many developers/project managers at
NASA may use a modified/tailored DoD-STD-2167A, IEEE software
standards, or other approaches.
There is a lot of work that must go into achieving complete, safe
and reliable software. However, schedules are tight and budgets
even tighter. We need to get the most "bang for our buck", that is
put the most effort into what will yield the highest pay-off.
Studies indicate that the most costly software errors ("error -
Human action that results in software containing a fault." IEEE
definition) occur during the requirements definition phase of the
software lifecycle.
Robyn Lutz of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), in a study of
errors found during integration and systems testing of the Voyager
and Galileo spacecraft [3] revealed that the majority of safety
related errors resulted from failure to identify or understand
functional requirements (62% on Voyager, 79% on Galileo). Of those
missing functional requirements, the majority were from
misunderstood hardware and software interface specifications (65%
Voyager, 48% Galileo). Non-safety related functional faults were
usually caused during implementation of the requirements.
As an error propagates through the software development lifecycle,
it becomes more and more expensive to fix as each requirement
becomes documented, designed to, implemented, and tested prior to
being found incorrect or missing. The 'cost of quality' is very
evident in estimating the cost to correct software errors. To fix
a problem when it is created costs little. Finding the problem in
the next development phase costs I0 times what it would have cost
to fix the problem before. If the problem is found during the
operational phase, it is I00 times more expensive to fix. Thus,
NASA is concentrating on getting the requirements correct first.
The next level of emphasis is to ensure that most errors are found
during the phase in which they are inserted. The old idea of
testing safety and quality into a product have just not proved to
be technically or cost effective. Software is notoriously
difficult, even impossible, to test for all possible paths that can
be taken.
Software Formal Inspections [4] is one method for finding errors at
the point within the development cycle in which they occur. It has
built in checklists that target each software lifecycle phase.
SFI has proved effective in discovering missing, incomplete and
wrong requirements early in the development process. JPL has
developed training, standards and guidelines for use of the Formal
Inspection process. The process was based on methods originally
created in 1972 by Michael Fagan when he was at IBM [5,6] and
expanded by John Kelly of JPL [7]. Software Formal Inspections(SFI) are a series of very structured, intra-lifecycle phase, peer
reviews of the non-released software product (documents, code, test
procedures, etc.). The method is straight forward, well laid out
and provides built in metrics. The results are quite impressive,
using formal inspections, the hours needed to fix a defect found by
SFI is about .7 hours as opposed to 5-18 hours if the defect is
left to be found during testing.
This method is being adopted, albeit slowly, within most of the
NASA centers. In addition to its built in metrics, checklists and
straight forward process, Formal Inspections target errors within
the lifecycle in which they are created. Taking small pieces of
the product and reviewing it in a non-adversarial atmosphere with
only those peers and experts which can contribute technically (i.e.
without management involvement), builds the team work and
empowerment aspects so important in NASA's goal to embrace Total
Quality Management. To a large extent, besides its logical
methodology, the growing success of Formal Inspections can be
attributed to the training and support that JPL provides to each
center to get the center started. NASA headquarters has further
supported this methodology by issuing a NASA Software Formal
Inspection Standard and Guidebook which follow the JPL SFI training
course.
THE NASA SOFTWARE SAFETY STANDARD
While a separate NASA Software Safety Standard is being created, it
is heavily stressed that software safety is a part of the overall
system safety effort and is not performed in isolation to the rest
of the system. Software gets its first indication of criticality
from the preliminary system safety analysis. As the iterative
process of both the system and software safety analysis progresses
to deeper levels of detail, information from each analysis flows to
the other.
Due to some uniqueness of software safety analyses and in order to
call attention to the need for a software safety
program/methodology within NASA, the Software Safety Standard is
currently a separate document and not combined within the NASA
Safety Policy and Requirements Document. This Software safety
standard is to be applied to all software acquired by NASA and all
software developed by NASA that is used as a part of a system that
possesses the potential of directly, or indirectly, causing harm to
humans or damage to property exterior to the system. When
software is acquired by NASA, this standard is to be specified in
contract clauses or memoranda of understanding. When software is
developed by NASA, this standard applies and will be specified in
the program plan, software management plan, or other controlling
document.
Software safety requires a coordinated effort among all
organizations involved in the development of NASA software.
Those conducting the Software Safety effort must interface with
personnel from disciplines such as reliability, Independent
Verification and Validation (when available), and human factors.
The purpose of the software safety process is to ensure that
software does not cause, or contribute to, a system reaching a
hazardous state; that it does not fail to detect or take
corrective action if the system reaches a hazardous state; and
that it does not fail to mitigate damage if an accident occurs.
The overall software safety process is to:
a o
bo
Ensure that the system/subsystem safety analyses
identify which software is safety-critical. Any software
that has the potential to cause a hazard or is required
to support control of a hazard, as identified by safety
analyses, is safety-critical software.
Ensure that the system/subsystem safety analyses clearly
identify the key inputs into the software requirements
specification e.g., identification of hazardous commands,
limits, interrelationship of limits, sequence of events,
timing constraints, voting logic, failure tolerance,
etc.
C. Ensure that the development of the software requirements
specification includes the software safety requirements
that have been identified by software safety analysis.
d° Ensure that the software design and implementation
properly incorporates the software safety requirements.
e . Ensure that the appropriate verification and validation
requirements are established to ensure proper
implementation of the software safety requirements.
f . Ensure that test plans and procedures satisfy the intent
of the verification requirements.
g.
Ensure that the results of the verification effort are
satisfactory.
Software safety procedures are to be performed as an integrated
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activity of the system safety effort. Those performing software
safety provide support during system concept definition, safety
planning, design of system architecture to minimize safety
critical configuration items, and identification of Safety Critical
Computer Software Components (SCCSCs). Using the results of the
system Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and system safety
requirements allocated to software as the starting point for SCCSC
identification, software safety continues to work software safety
requirements definition and analysis activities throughout software
development and test.
The software safety effort provides hazard analysis reports,
software safety analyses and testing results to system safety, on
a continuous basis, for inclusion in the System Hazard Analysis and
Integrated Hazard Analysis.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Once identified, a potential hazard may be I) eliminated, 2)
mitigated, or 3) accepted. Hazards are categorized based on both
severity and likelihood of occurrence with "i" being the most
critical. (See Figure 3.) The order of precedence for satisfying
system and software safety requirements and for resolving
identified hazards is as follows:
a. Design for Minimum Risk. From the onset, design to
eliminate hazards. If an identified hazard cannot be
eliminated, reduce the associated risk to an acceptable
level, as defined by management, through design
selection.
b. Incorporate Safety Devices and/or Failure Tolerance
(These can be either software, hardware, or software and
hardware combined). If identified hazards cannot be
eliminated or their associated risk adequately reduced
through design selection, that risk is to be reduced to
a level acceptable to the management through the use of
fixed, automatic, or other protective safety design
features or devices, or redundancy.
C • Provide Warning Devices (These can be either software,
hardware, or software and hardware combined). When
neither design nor safety features/devices can
effectively eliminate identified hazards or adequately
reduce associated risk, devices are to be used to detect
the condition and to produce an adequate warning signal
to alert personnel of the hazard. Warning signals and
their application are to be designed to minimize the
probability of incorrect personnel reaction to the
signals and be standardized within like types of systems.
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do Develop Procedures and Training. Where it is impractical
to eliminate hazards through design selection or
adequately reduce the associated risk with safety and
warning devices, procedures and training are to be used.
However, without a specific waiver, no warning, caution,
or other form of written advisory can be used as the only
risk reduction method for Category 1 and 2 hazards (See
Figure 3).
The decision (based on all relevant factors) to accept a hazard
with its associated risk is a management responsibility, and
requires coordination and concurrence by the designated safety
official and the Program Manager. If there is a lack of
concurrence on the decision between management and safety at any
level, those performing safety on that project will elevate the
decision to the next Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and
Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) management level. The probability of
mishap coupled with the severity of the possible consequences is
the major consideration in that decision. The Risk Assessment
approach to determine the hazard category is shown in Figure 3.
PROBABLE
LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE
OCCASIONAL REMOTE IMPROBABLE
SEVERITY
LEVELS
CATASTROPHIC
CRITICAL
MARGINAL
1
1
2
1 2
2 3
3 4 5
Figure 3. Safety Categorization
SYSTEM SAFETY
The Software Safety process really begins during the system concept
and requirements phase. The system Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHA), and subsequent system and software safety analyses,
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initially identify when software is a potential cause of a hazard
or will be used to support the control of a hazard. This software
is classified as safety-critical and is subjected to software
safety analysis. Safety-critical software is typically I) software
which exercises direct command and control over potentially
hazardous functions and or hardware, 2) software that monitors
critical hardware components, 3) software which monitors the system
for possible critical conditions and/or states, and/or 4) software
that if not executed or is executed incorrectly, inadvertently, or
out of sequence could result in a hazard or allow a hazardous
condition to exist.
The system safety analyses are the first place to identify
software safety requirements necessary to support the development
of the software requirements specification. These requirements are
then provided to the developer for inclusion into the software
requirements document. Some examples of software safety
requirements include limits (e.g., redlines, boundary values),
sequence of events, timing constraints, interrelationship of
limits, voting logic, hazardous hardware failure recognition,
failure tolerance, caution and warning interfaces, hazardous
commands, etc.
Within each phase of the software development lifecycle, two
interrelated safety activities take place. One is the safety
analysis of the deliverables produced within that lifecycle phase.
These analyses determine if new potential hazards have arisen and
if previously identified hazards have been properly removed or
mitigated. The other activity consists of providing or building
into the process and products known software safety requirements,
practices, implementation techniques, and test methods.
SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS PHASE
There are two main software safety tasks that are performed at this
stage of the lifecycle, i) further development of software safety
requirements and 2) analysis of the software requirements for
potential hazards.
Analysis of the software requirements can reveal potential hazards
that the system safety analysis was unable to surface or can show
where system requirements were not flowed into the software
properly. These potential hazards can then be addressed by adding
or changing system and/or software requirements.
Software Formal Inspections can have their highest affect when used
at this stage of the software development lifecycle. The
procedures help ensure that all appropriate personnel (e.g. system
engineers, hardware designers, users, etc.) work together to focus
on ensuring that all the requirements are in place and correctly
defined.
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SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE/PRELIMINARY DESIGN PHASE
The software architectural design process develops the high level
design that implements the software requirements. This includes
all software safety requirements. During the design process, the
software safety engineer identifies safety design features and
methods (e.g., inhibits, traps, interlocks and assertions) that can
be used throughout the software to implement the software safety
requirements. Safety specific coding standards are also developed
which identify requirements for annotation of safety-critical code
and limitation on use of certain language features which can reduce
software safety. After allocation of the software safety
requirements to the software design, the next level SCCSCs are
identified. These are all software components which implement
software safety requirements or components which interface with
SCCSCs which can affect their output.
Analysis is performed on the architectural design to identify
potential hazards and on the test plans to verify incorporation of
safety related testing. Input/ output timing, multiple event,
out-of-sequence event, failure of event, wrong event, inappropriate
magnitude, incorrect polarity, adverse environmental, deadlocking,
and hardware failure sensitivities are included in the analysis.
SOFTWARE DETAILED DESIGN PHASE
After development of the detailed design, unit level SCCSCs are
identified. These are all software units that implement software
safety requirements or units which interface with SCCSCs which can
affect their output.
During this phase, safety-related information is incorporated into
all user manuals. This information includes cautions, warnings,
and procedures for handling safety related procedures and hazards.
These documents include the User's Guides and Operational
Procedures. Software Formal Inspections of these documents will
help assure the incorporation of the appropriate safety features.
Test cases which verify the software safety requirements and
identify potential hazards are developed during this phase. The
safety related test cases are to ensure that the software responds
correctly to potential hazards and does not initiate any hazards.
These test cases support Computer Software Component Item (CSCI),
system and acceptance level testing.
A Detailed Design Analysis (DDA) is performed on the design to
identify potential hazards and on test cases to ensure
incorporation of safety related testing. A comprehensive Fault
Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) philosophy should be
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incorporated in the design as well as implementation of the caution
and warning requirements and further breakout of safety
requirements. All of which are analyzed and related to the system
safety requirements to assure that the software design is still on
target with system requirements, design, and implementation.
SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION/CODING PHASE
The software implementation translates the detailed design into
code in the selected programming language. As part of the
process, the detailed design for the SCCSC is translated into the
code in accordance with the safety specific coding standards. The
code also implements any safety design features and methods
developed during the design process.
Safety-critical code is to be commented with enough information and
warning so that any future changes can be made with a reduced
probability of introducing new software hazards.
Test procedures which support CSCI, system and acceptance level
testing are developed during this phase to verify the software
safety requirements and identify potential hazards. The safety
related procedures include negative, no-go and stress testing to
ensure that the software responds correctly to potential hazards
and does not initiate any hazards.
The safety engineer performs and documents a Code-Level Software
Analysis (CSA). Using the results of the Detailed Design Analysis,
if previously accomplished, the safety activity analyzes program
code and system interfaces for events, faults, and conditions that
could cause or contribute to undesired events affecting safety.
This analysis starts when coding begins and continues throughout
the system life cycle. The results of the CSA are presented at
software in-process reviews and system level safety reviews.
Activities to be accomplished during CSA are described below:
a. Analyze:
i) SCCSCs for correctness and completeness, and for
input/output timing, multiple event,
out-of-sequence event, failure of event, adverse
environment, deadlocking, wrong event,
inappropriate magnitude, improper polarity, and
hardware failure sensitivities.
2) Software implementation of safety criteria called
out in the system specifications and requirements
documents.
3) Possible combinations of hardware failures,
14
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b,
C •
software failures, transient errors, and other
events that could cause the system to operate in a
hazardous manner.
4) Proper error handling for inappropriate or
incorrect data in the input data stream.
5) Fail-safe and fail-soft modes.
6) Input overload or out-of-bound conditions.
Perform an internal path and control process flow
analysis on SCCSCs.
Any resulting design, coding, and testing change
recommendations must be documented first in a hazard
report or safety analysis report. Approved changes are
then incorporated into the codes, design and if need be,
the requirements specification and test documents as
well.
d. Use formal methods and Software Formal Inspections
procedures to verify that the as-written code conforms to
the logical design specification and as a means to assure
concurrence with standards. In addition, use of a
checklist of common coding pitfalls, available from the
SFI guidebook, helps reduce the chance of avoidable
errors.
SOFTWARE TESTING AND ACCEPTANCE PHASE
Safety testing is performed to verify correct incorporation of
software safety requirements and identify potential hazards not
identified earlier in the lifecycle. Software safety testing is
performed at the integration, Computer Software Component Item
(CSCI) level, the system and acceptance levels. Testing at the
system and acceptance level verifies correct operation of the
SCCSCs in conjunction with system hardware and operators. It also
verifies correct operational stress conditions in the presence of
system faults. In addition, the testing verifies that safety
related procedures incorporated in the user's manuals perform as
expected.
Unacceptable hazards, as defined by the safety plan, identified
during testing, are corrected and reverified prior to software
delivery or usage.
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SOFTWARE OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
The above processes used to specify, develop, analyze and test
SCCSCs are also used when changes are made to that software. The
process includes updating the software safety requirements,
identification of new SCCSCs, updating of specification, design,
and operator documentation for SCCSCs, updating and adding
comments for safety critical code, and testing of the SCCSCs.
Testing includes regression testing to verify correct
implementation of all software safety requirements.
SAFETY RELATED TASKS PERFORMED THROUGHOUT THE LIFECYCLE
A tracking system within the configuration management structure is
used to ensure that software safety requirements are properly
implemented and verified. A description of the implementation of
each requirement is essential. The tracking of software hazard
closures and verification should be accomplished through safety
analysis documentation (e.g., hazard reports).
A project/program is required to conduct a series of formal safety
reviews/audits to ensure that implementation of safety controls
for hazards are adequate for the system and to approve any safety
related waivers or deviations.
User interface analyses are performed to ensure that all necessary
status related to safety functions is presented to the user to
allow the user to take the necessary actions. Included is an
evaluation of the User's Guide and Operational Procedures Manual to
ensure I) they contain any safety related operations to mitigate or
respond to hazards, and 2) they do not contain procedures which
initiate or contribute to hazards.
SUMMARY
While there remains much to do, NASA is taking the right steps to
address software safety and the software process as a whole. The
Software Safety Standard lays the foundation; next we need to work
towards full compliance across NASA. While tailoring is permitted
to account for project severity and size, a core safety activity
and a minimum set of software safety requirements must remain. To
meet NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin's challenge of "faster,
better, cheaper, without compromising safety" we need to utilize
software, with all its versatility, more and more heavily. Created
within the right environment, with proper safety definition and
analyses, methods like Software Formal Inspections, and standard
software procedures and practices, NASA software can, and will be,
safer and more reliable.
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